T his study examines coordination issues that occur in allocating spending between advertising and information technology (IT) in electronic retailing. Electronic retailers run the risk of overspending on advertising to attract customers but underspending on IT, thus resulting in inadequate processing capacity at the firm's website. In this paper, we present a centralized, joint marketing-IT model to optimally allocate spending between advertising and IT, and we discuss an uncoordinated case where marketing and IT make suboptimal advertising and capacity decisions. We show how these decisions can be coordinated either by reducing the value of a customer session or by designing an optimal processing contract between marketing and IT. Both the coordination methods can be implemented with only local knowledge of the IT function, yet they generate a solution that almost matches the quality of the centralized solution. We extend our basic model to consider demand uncertainty, lagged advertising effects, and uncertainties in the lead time to acquire IT capacity. With demand uncertainty, electronic retailers should reduce spending on advertising and increase IT capacity if there is potential for a demand upswing and the cost of IT capacity is relatively low. The value of a customer session should be further reduced when uncertainties exist. This is required to share the risk of excess or inadequate IT capacity.
Introduction
The last few years have observed an explosive growth in online business-to-consumer commerce, and this trend is likely to continue as the number of Internet users around the world continues to grow: The worldwide online population is projected by Computer Industry Almanac, Inc., to grow from 934 million in 2004 to 1.35 billion in 2007 1.35 billion in (ClickZ.com 2005 . Thus, despite the recent economic slowdown, online shopping may still grow substantially over the next few years. To benefit from the fast-growing online market, electronic retailers must establish positive relationships with new online buyers who are often sensitive to response times at websites and prone to abandon shopping if the processing speed is slow (Green 1999) . Zona Research, a market analysis firm, estimated that slow response times could be costing ecommerce merchants more than $20 billion in sales each year (Tillett 2001) .
Poor website performance could be a result of inaccurately estimating demand and capacity requirements (Karpinski 2000) . Another reason could be poor spending allocation between demand-generation activities (e.g., sales and marketing efforts to attract customers), and capacity-provision activities (i.e., providing adequate information technology (IT) capacity to support the processing needs of customers). Electronic retailers run the risk of overspending on advertising to attract customers but not enough on IT, thus resulting in inadequate processing capacity at a firm's website. Therefore, coordinating demand-generation decisions and those concerning IT capacity is a significant issue for electronic retailers.
Problem and Motivation
In a typical e-commerce website, the shopping function can be divided into browsing and buying. The Web server (which, in reality, could be a collection of individual computers) supports front-end tasks that are dedicated for browsing activities, such as comparing products, searching, and placing items in a virtual shopping cart. On the other hand, buying is typically handled by a transaction server (or set of servers). Examples of buying (checkout) activities are credit card processing, order confirmation, order tracking, and so on.
Our focus in this study is on browsing or precheckout processing. While browsing, customers are likely to be particularly sensitive to response time and may quit if the response time is not acceptable. On the other hand, shoppers are less likely to quit during the checkout phase because, at this stage, they already have invested in the shopping process (time, money, information, etc.) . For example, customers typically will not quit after they have entered sensitive information, such as a credit card number, or have provided personal information, such as a shipping address or a home telephone number.
There are three possible outcomes of a customer's visit. First, the customer may make a purchase. Second, the customer may browse the site, but at the end, decide not to make a purchase. Finally, the customer may leave the website before the purchase decision because of inadequate response. Our study focuses on the third scenario-a potential customer leaves a website because the response time is too slow. If this happens too frequently, it may be better to reduce the level of advertising and divert some resources to improve the response time. This requires coordination between the department responsible for choosing the level of advertising (for simplicity, marketing) and the one responsible for choosing the processing capacity of the site (for simplicity, IT). Of course, if the two decisions are made by a (common) central authority, then the coordination problem is not relevant. In this case, the problem reduces to one of jointly optimizing demand-generation and IT-capacity decisions.
Contributions and Findings
The main contributions and findings of this study are as follows.
(1) We have formulated and solved a centralized spending model where the levels of advertising and IT capacity are jointly determined to maximize profit. The novel aspect of the model is that we explicitly consider the impact of customer impatience on the choice of optimal processing capacity for a website. We have also identified optimal operating strategies for various combinations of advertising and IT costs.
(2) In an uncoordinated spending model, the marketing department "overadvertises" because IT costs (capacity cost and lost sales due to inadequate capacity) are ignored. We discuss two methods to coordinate the marketing and IT departments: (1) reduced session value and (2) processing contracts. In the first method, the tendency to overadvertise is corrected by reducing the value of a session from h to * . The reduced value from a customer session lowers advertising spending to the optimal level. Although the expression for * depends on both IT and marketing parameters, an important property of the reduced session value is that it is more sensitive to IT costs than advertising costs. We use this property to demonstrate that a near-optimal solution can be obtained even when the reduced session value is computed locally (i.e., ignoring advertising costs) by the IT department. Another coordination method is to design a processing contract between marketing and IT. Here, marketing pays a processing fee that is based on the mean level of demand generated. The optimalprocessing contract exhibits quantity discounts and profit sharing.
(3) We find that with uncertain demand, electronic retailers should lower their spending on advertising but increase IT capacity to prepare for a possible upswing in the demand. However, increasing IT capacity in the face of higher demand uncertainty is optimal only when the cost of IT capacity is below a threshold. We incorporate two extensions to our base model: lagged advertising effects and uncertain lead times for IT capacity acquisition. With these extensions, advertising and capacity levels are lowered and the session value reduces further to accommodate the risks that arise from uncertainties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review related work. In §3, we set up the basic model-a centralized spending model. Section 4 analyzes coordination between the marketing and IT functions. In §5, we extend the basic model to include uncertainties associated with demand and capacity. Section 6 concludes and provides directions for future research. Supplementary material in the form of an electronic companion is available at the Management Science website (http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html).
Related Work
We review literature in four areas: (1) coordinated decision making, (2) advertising response functions, (3) customer impatience and time sharing at a website, and (4) pricing of computing services. We end this section with a brief discussion of how the present work differs from previous research.
Coordinated Decision Making
The idea of coordinated decision making across different organizational units is not new (Fauli-Oller and Giralt 1995) . Shapiro (1977) studied coordinated decisions between the marketing and production functions of an organization. Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) demonstrated the benefit of coordinated policies (price and order quantity), as opposed to a decentralized scenario in which marketing chooses a demand level (using only marketing considerations), which production accepts and determines an order quantity to minimize the total cost. More recently, Morgan et al. (2001) studied marketing and manufacturing trade-offs in the context of product-line design. From a marketing point of view, higher product variety serves customer preferences better; however, production lines can get overextended and negatively impact manufacturing effectiveness. Thus, manufacturing synergies among products can be exploited to realize cost savings while still providing variety to the marketplace. Finally, Ho et al. (2002) modified the traditional Bass model of new product diffusion to include quality-of-service effects. The quality of service-measured by lost sales or backordersaffects "internal influence" or "word of mouth."
Advertising Response Functions
There is substantial research on the relationship between advertising and observed demand. Little (1975) proposed an S-shaped relationship to describe the effect of advertising on sales and market share. Johansson (1979) presented a logistic relationship between market share and the amount of spending that includes "word of mouth" and saturation effects. Mahajan and Muller (1986) found that pulsing is more effective than a continuous effort for the S-shaped advertising function. Carpenter et al. (1988) modified the Lanchester model of competition in advertising spending to include differential advertising effects (across brands) and lagged effects. Villas-Boas (1993) studied competition in the timing of advertising and found that a Markov equilibrium strategy (in the differential game) is to follow an out-of-phase pulse schedule for advertising.
Time Sharing
Another factor of interest to our study is the phenomenon of waiting at an e-commerce site. An e-commerce site is best described as a time-shared, loss system where the processing capacity of the server is shared across the customers that are viewing the site. The concept of time sharing has been widely studied in scheduling computer processing (Kleinrock 1964 , Coffman et al. 1970 , Morrison 1985 . In time sharing, processing power is divided among existing jobs in the system on a full-time, but partcapacity, basis. This method is often referred to as the processor-sharing scheme. The time waited is proportional to the processing time attained, suggesting that round-robin systems are more fair than sequential queues because the waiting time in a sequential system does not depend on the actual amount of processing time incurred on a job.
The impatient buyers who abandon shopping when the response time exceeds their tolerance for delay account for the major cause of lost sales in e-commerce sites. Customer impatience has been studied in the queuing area for about 40 years (Barrer 1957, Ancker and Gafarian 1963) and is still an active research area (Whitt 1999) . Coffman et al. (1994) examined the asymptotic behavior of reneging in timeshared systems.
Pricing of Computing Services
There are several previous studies that deal with the pricing of computing services (Mendelson 1985 , Mendelson and Whang 1990 , Dewan and Mendelson 1990 . Our work distinguishes itself from these studies because of the problem context under consideration. The context in earlier research is that of an internal computing facility serving users belonging to the same organization. In an internal computing center, users typically have no other facility to which they can go if the response time is poor. Thus, users incur delay once a job is submitted to the center. Our context is different because customers are not likely to stay and suffer delay in a slow e-commerce site. In our model, the impact of poor response time is captured by allowing impatient customers to leave the site because the server response is slow. Thus, while previous studies have modeled the mean arrival rate to be a function of delay, we consider the mean arrival rate to depend only on the level of advertising.
Centralized Model
We present notation that is used to develop the centralized model in Table 1 . Notation that will be used in later sections of this paper is also included here for convenience. Next, we state some useful preliminaries for the model. Finally we develop several propositions that describe the optimal spending allocation in the centralized case.
Preliminaries
Advertising. An e-retailer's demand is 0 0 > 0 without any advertising. However, additional demand can be generated (and sustained) by continuously spending on advertising. In the marketing literature, demand as a function of advertising expenditure follows the so-called S-curve. At low levels of advertising spending, the demand grows rapidly through word of mouth, but beyond this region, demand saturates as it approaches the market size,
. In this study, we use the logistic relationship derived by Johansson (1979) ,
where A is the spending on advertising, and a is an advertising cost parameter that measures advertising effectiveness. The functional form results from assuming that the rate of growth in demand depends on the level of existing demand and the remaining demand, i.e., d /dA ∝ − . Inversely, the required advertising spending to reach a demand level can be expressed as
The IT department is responsible for processing customer requests during a session. We use the processing rate, , to represent IT capacity (Mendelson 1985) . A large value of reduces the time required to process a customer request. The cost to increase the capacity is linearexplicitly, C = 0 + 1 . This is a reasonable model for IT cost (Mendelson 1985) . Note that the cost C (cost per unit time) includes a one-time capacity acquisition cost and a continuous operating cost necessary to maintain a processing capacity of .
A typical e-commerce site is best described as a time-shared, finite, and loss system. Usually a new session (or connection) is opened for each entering customer and the available processing capacity is divided equally across the current number of active sessions. This type of time sharing is commonly referred to as processor sharing (PS). There is a limit on number of sessions allowed, K, and a request for a new session is disallowed if there are already K active sessions. Such a situation (i.e., when the session limit has been reached) results in one type of loss, balking. On the other hand, customers may be impatient and leave the site if the response time exceeds their waiting tolerance. This results in a second type of loss, reneging. Our emphasis here is on the second type of loss because it is quite uncommon for a website to reach the session limit. One situation in which the session limit may be reached is a denial of service attack on the site. These are fairly extreme conditions, so we do not consider exceeding the session limit to be a capacity-planning problem; rather, it is a security problem that needs to be handled differently.
To model the performance of the site, we make the following four assumptions.
• First, customers arrive at the site according to a Poisson process with mean . This assumption represents the real situation quite well (Moe and Fader 2004) . For this section and the next, we will assume that the mean arrival rate is constant, i.e., the arrival process is stationary. In §5 we consider a nonstationary arrival process.
• Second, each session requires a processing time that has a mean 1/ , and a generic distribution. The processing time for a session is the total processing time across the requests generated during the session. Because each request can require different amounts of processing and there can be a variable number of requests in a session, allowing the total processing time distribution for a session to be generic provides robustness to the analysis.
• Third, customers are impatient during a session and may quit randomly at any time. We assume that, with a session-oriented protocol, the information that a customer has quit is not immediately observed by the server and, as an approximation, assume that the session continues to be served even though the session owner (the customer that submitted the session) has quit. Thus, the quitting of customers has no effect on the number of sessions being served and, hence, does not relieve system congestion.
• Fourth, each customer has a time budget for the session and leaves the site if the session is not completed within it. The time budget may vary across customers and even across sessions for the same customer. We assume that the time budget is exponentially distributed with mean 1/ (Ancker and Gafarian 1963a, b) .
Based on the above assumptions and queuing results for M/G/1/K/P S queues (Sevcik and Mitrani 1981) , we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The loss of customers, defined as the expected rate at which customers drop out of the system due to a session limit and customer impatience, is
where = / , and
Proof. See the online supplement at http://mansci. pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html for all the proofs not included in the paper.
Strictly speaking, the service rate and maximum number of sessions K both represent site capacity parameters. However, as mentioned earlier, except for extreme cases, such as a denial of service attack, the site speed (or the response time) typically presents the more serious bottleneck. In this study, we focus on the service rate as a measure of IT capacity and develop a model to choose it optimally. 1 Corollary 1. In the case where K → and < , the loss of customers becomes
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1. It is necessary that < so the system can reach steady state. Note that in Proposition 1, because the number of session connections is bounded by K, the condition that < can be relaxed and the system will still be stable. In this paper we focus on the loss due to customer impatience (instead of balking), so we let K → and enforce < .
Centralized Allocation Model
Using Corollary 1, the total revenue per unit time is
where h is the average session value. In a centralized setting, the demand and the capacity must be jointly chosen to maximize the expected profit,
Proposition 2. Given that > , the profit function is concave in the region defined by
and > /2; outside this region, the profit function is saddle shaped and interior maxima do not exist.
In the region where the profit is concave, it is possible to locate a local (interior) maximum. If such a maximum exists (see details in Proposition 3), the demand at this maximum should be above half the market size.
2 It can be observed that lowering the advertising cost parameter a shrinks the region where the profit is concave and pushes up the optimal demand level * . Figure 1 illustrates the regions 1 Many of the results in this paper can be obtained, albeit numerically, with a fixed session limit K. We have omitted these results because they do not add anything new to the insights provided here and instead focus on the case where the number of connections does not pose a capacity bottleneck. A model in which the session limit is itself a decision variable is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Our belief, however, is that such a model would be of less practical value. Figure 1 , the equation for the thick curve separating the regions where the profit function is either concave or saddle shaped is described by Equation (2).
It is possible that another local maximum exists on the boundary of the region where the profit function is saddle shaped. We argue later that such a maximum may exist only along the line = 0 . The global maximum can therefore be found by comparing the two local maxima.
Characteristics of Optimal Policies
Interior Maximum. An interior maximum (if it exists), can easily be found using first-order conditions of the unconstrained optimization problem for the centralized allocation model. We have summarized the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. There is at most one interior maximum. The optimal demand * in is the larger root of
in the region /2 < < . The corresponding optimal capacity is given by
The condition under which the interior maximum exists can be expressed as * in ≥ th * in (5) where th is defined in Proposition 2 (Equation (2)).
Equation (4) is derived by setting / = 0 for a given demand level. The function calculates the optimal capacity for a demand level. Equation (5) (with an equal sign) is plotted in Figure 2 as the thick line, above which an interior solution does not exist. Equation (3) where F = * in * in * in , respectively. It is intuitive that with an increase in the cost of advertising or IT capacity, both the optimal demand level and the IT capacity should decrease. Take the case where the advertising cost parameter (a) is held constant while the IT capacity cost 1 is increased. Obviously, the e-retailer should decrease capacity. This in turn has a negative impact on number of sessions that can be processed and completed. Therefore, the level of advertising should also be adjusted downward, even though the cost of advertising has been held constant. This example highlights the importance of coordinating the marketing and IT functions. In a decentralized setting, marketing chooses a demand level, based purely on the advertising cost parameter, a. However, it is clear from the above argument that IT capacity cost should be considered by marketing to arrive at the optimal level of advertising. In the next section we show how coordination can be achieved by conveying IT cost information to marketing.
Boundary Maximum. The profit function is saddle shaped outside the region where it is concave. This suggests that local maxima can exist only on the boundary. For any point inside the region where the profit function is saddle shaped, one can always find a direction to move to increase the profit function, until the boundary is reached. Note that the region where the profit function is concave is inclusive of the boundary that separates it from the region where the profit function is saddle shaped (shown in Proposition 2 and Figure 1) . If there is a maximum on the boundary, it is treated and solved as an interior maximum.
Other than an interior (local) maximum, the only possible local maximum is along the line = 0 (corresponding to no-advertising effort). The condition: 0 < h 0 , needs to be satisfied for a maximum yielding a nonnegative profit. Whereas 0 is concave with respect to , a local optimal capacity level can be obtained as * b = 0 , where the optimal response function is defined in Proposition 3. To ensure a local maximum, it is required that * b / = 0 ≤ 0, which is equivalent to R 0 ≥ 0, where the function R is given in Proposition 3. This inequality may not hold when 1 and a are small. This is intuitive; not advertising will produce a suboptimal result if the costs are low. The optimal capacity * b , as well as the profit * b , decreases with 1 and the profit becomes negative when
The above expression defines an upper bound (threshold) for the cost of IT capacity in the absence of advertising effort. In the special case where 0 = , the capacity cost threshold becomes 1 = h 1 − 0 /h 0 2 /4. Furthermore, if 0 is set to zero,
In Figure 2 , we have also plotted the existence region of this local (boundary) maximum, defined by R 0 ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ 1 , in the cost domain.
Global Maximum. We compare the profit values at the two local maxima to find the global maximum. Figure 3 defines three regions in the rescaled (dimensionless) cost domain, with 0 / = 1. In Region I, an interior maximum dominates as it yields a higher (positive) profit. As the cost of advertising increases (Region II), spending on advertising is not optimal, so * = 0 , and the optimal IT capacity level is chosen to match the base level of demand. It is infeasible to operate in Region III. Equation (6) gives the line separating Regions II and III. The market size, , does not appear to affect the boundaries much. Figure 4 shows three regions with / = 10. A higher value of 0 yields higher profits with zero advertising, and consequently enlarges Region II.
We consider other limiting cases. When the cost of advertising is low, e.g., a → 0, we find that the optimal demand approaches the market size in a manner 
Coordination Design
In this section, we begin with the case where the IT and the marketing departments make capacity and advertising decisions in an uncoordinated manner (Fauli-Oller and Giralt 1995) . Under these circumstances, it can be shown that marketing will overspend on advertising to attract more demand than what is optimal. We note here that there is an inherent asymmetry in our setting of the uncoordinated case: marketing (being upstream) chooses the demand locally whereas IT (being downstream) reacts to this demand with an optimal choice for the capacity. We next propose two ways of coordinating the two departments: (1) using a reduced session value and (2) using a processing contract. Both these methods can be operated with parameters to achieve the same level of profit as that obtained by the first-best solution (i.e., the centralized case). The first setting (reduced session value) may be applicable in situations where IT acts as a cost center and sends marketing a signal (the reduced session value) that embeds in it knowledge about capacity costs and customer impatience. The second setting (processing contracts) may be better suited to the case where IT operates as a profit center. In this case, IT charges a processing fee to marketing that depends on the mean level of demand. We begin the discussion in this section with the uncoordinated case.
Uncoordinated Case
In the uncoordinated case, marketing, ignoring IT costs, selects a demand level, and IT responds to this level (i.e., IT is a demand taker) and chooses an optimal capacity so that the total cost, hL + C, is minimized. The objective function for the IT department is the sum of the cost of lost sales and the cost of IT capacity. The optimal capacity for any given demand is, = , which yields the same capacity as the centralized case, provided that the demand takes the value of the demand level in the centralized solution ( * ). Figure 5 plots the percentage decrease in profit from the centralized policy to the profit obtained in the (uncoordinated) decentralized case. As shown in the figure, the profit in the decentralized case becomes worse as the cost of IT capacity increases. This figure motivates the need to coordinate marketing and IT decisions. As mentioned earlier, when an appropriate coordination scheme is imposed, the optimal demand level and IT capacity can be achieved.
Reduced Session Value
We start with an alternative, but equivalent, solution to the centralized profit-maximization problem solved in the last section. The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, we can use the form of this solution to show that independent, demand-level decisions made by IT and marketing are suboptimal. Second, this approach suggests a way to coordinate decision making in a decentralized setting.
Proposition 4. There exists a positive real number
Observe that in Proposition 4, IT or M are expressed in terms of only IT or only marketing parameters ( and 1 , or and a). This suggests the possibility of separating the marketing and IT decisions, while maintaining the profit of the centralized approach. Optimality is achieved when is chosen to match the demand levels chosen by IT and marketing. The equation that solves for * (Equation (7)) is a quartic (4th order) equation in , whose analytical solution is cumbersome. In the online supplement, we show that if * < 4a/ , marketing should choose not to advertise, whereas the condition * < h− 1 has to hold such that IT < * . Hence an optimal value of * is very easy to find by searching in the range, 4a/ h − 1 . There are at most two real roots, but the smaller root is a saddle-point solution, whereas the larger root gives the maximum.
In the uncoordinated case, the marketing department moves first and choose a demand level to maximize its profit: h − A. Note that IT costs do not figure into the marketing department's objective function. This gives a demand level
Compared with the first-best solution given in Proposition 4, the above level of demand is higher than optimal (since * < h). This (suboptimal) choice of demand arises from the fact that the per-session value is overestimated because the IT cost is ignored. To bring the demand down to the optimal level, a reduced session value * is used instead of the true session value h . The reduction in session value can be attributed to the costs of advertising and IT. It is worth noting that h − * = h · L * * / ; that is, the reduction in the session value is the same as the marginal lost sale. Corollary 3 shows that each session should be valued less as IT capacity cost increases ( * / 1 < 0 . It is intuitive that higher costs of advertising and capacity reduce the session value. An increased potential market reduces the effective (per customer) advertising cost, and hence improves the session value.
Characteristics of Reduced Session Value
We next numerically examine the impact of parameters on the reduced session value * . From Equation (7), we observe that * /h is a function of only three (normalized) factors: 4a/h , 1 /h, and / . In Table 2 , we fix the value of / to 10 and vary the other two factors in their full ranges where the solution of * exists. 3 Typically, * decreases almost linearly with 1 , but barely changes with the advertising cost parameter a. This suggests that * typically carries more information about IT cost than advertising cost. Obviously, this is a result of the different cost structures used for IT capacity and advertising cost. The effect of market size ( / ) is depicted in Table 3 where 1 /h = 0 2. With a larger / , * becomes less dependent on the advertising cost.
Sequential Coordination Scheme
In general, to achieve the centralized solution in a decentralized setting, complete information about IT and marketing costs needs to be collected. In the design of supply chain contracts, it is often assumed that the required information to design an optimal contract can be exchanged and sequentially revealed (Cachon 2002 , Albin 1971 .
We next describe how the coordination problem can be solved almost optimally without full information. Given that the reduced session value is not sensitive to advertising costs, it may be proposed that the IT department is the natural choice for locally Table 2 Normalized 
determining this value, i.e., without complete knowledge of the advertising cost. We first consider a situation in which the IT department calculates the value of * based on inaccurate information about the advertising cost. The marketing department uses the value of * suggested by IT and chooses a demand level using its (true) advertising cost (for Table 4 , the true value is a = 0 8). Although the first-best solution cannot be achieved, Table 4 (where 1 = 0 2) shows that the reduction in profit from using a false value of the advertising cost parameter is reasonably small except in some extreme cases. Numerical simulations indicate that the reduction in profit becomes even smaller at smaller values of the IT cost parameter 1 .
There are two observations from Table 4 . First, the reduction in profit is caused by IT's premature commitment to a capacity level. In our setting, IT chooses or adjusts capacity after observing the demand level chosen by marketing. After the capacity adjustment, the profit almost matches that of the centralized solution. Second, it is better to underestimate, rather than overestimate, the advertising cost parameter a . Thus, it may be better for IT to completely ignore the advertising cost (i.e., use a = 0 in calculating * ) if this cost is hard to estimate. In light of these observations, we propose a three-step sequential coordination Table 3 Normalized Reduced Per-Session Value scheme:
Step 1: IT assumes that a = 0 and estimates * as
Step 2: Marketing chooses a demand level based on * provided.
Step 3: IT chooses capacity: = . We have tested the above coordination scheme using the full range of feasible advertising costs where the profit is positive. The performance results, presented in Table 5 with 1 /h = 0 2, indicate that the scheme works very well. Numerical tests with other values of 1 /h yield similar performance.
Processing Contracts
If the IT department operates as a profit center, a processing fee charged to marketing becomes a source of revenue for the IT department. Here we derive the structure of a processing contract that maximizes the profit to the firm. Because the coordination occurs within an organization, we assume that it is mandatory for marketing to pay this processing fee. Consider a volume-based processing contract between marketing and IT where a fee is paid to IT by marketing. 5 The marketing department chooses a demand level to maximize profit: h m − m − A. Similarly, acting as a profit center, the IT department chooses an acceptable demand level and capacity to maximize it − hL it − 0 + 1 . Equilibrium is reached if two demand levels match, that is, it = m . 4 Note that * not only carries IT cost information, it also aggregates other operational details (e.g., the effect of customer impatience). It is reasonable for IT to calculate the value of * because IT will not only have accurate knowledge of capacity costs, but it will also be expected to possess better knowledge about impatient customer behavior. 5 Processing contracts of this kind are more likely to be based on mean demand levels. Hence we consider a contract form based on the mean session arrival rate rather than on the actual number of sessions initiated. 
Proposition 5. IT and marketing can achieve coordination if a processing contract, , is imposed. ) satisfies,
and, in addition, if both parties are required to earn positive profits,
A * , where * and * are centralized solutions.
Proposition 5 defines a class of processing contracts, , that can achieve the profit of the centralized case by coordinating the demand choices made by the marketing and IT departments. Parts (i) and (ii) guarantee that this scheme is incentive compatible. We note that is concave in implying a "quantity discount" provided by IT to marketing. The first inequality in Part (ii) forces IT to provide quantity discounts. The extent of the discount is governed by the second inequality in Part (ii). Table 5 Performance of Sequential Coordination Scheme The function must be tangential to the line 0 + h − * at = * , where * is the demand level in the centralized case. If 0 = 0, it can be shown that IT always runs with negative profit, or as a deficit center analogous to the one noted by Mendelson (1985) in the presence of delay cost. The intuition is similar: the payment collected by IT is only sufficient to recover the IT cost, but not enough to also cover the sales lost due to customer impatience, that is, h − * * − 1 * = 1 < hL * * . If, in some situations, both parties are required to earn positive profits, i.e., their respective individual rationality requirements must also be satisfied, then the parameter 0 has to be positive, and its value range is determined by Part (iii). When Part (iii) is satisfied, our contract is analogous to a two-part tariff scheme (Van Mieghem 2000) . The fixed amount ( 0 ) represents profit sharing or profit redistribution.
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Corollary 4. The linear contract scheme,
Proof. The second condition in Proposition 4 is violated.
With linear pricing, the centralized policy ( * * is actually a saddle-point solution for the IT department. Therefore, the IT department can deviate from this point to increase its profit, and equilibrium will not be reached. In such conditions, IT prefers the demand level , and plans for capacity accordingly. This will result in a waste of capacity, as the actual demand will be below .
In addition to optimal capacity and demand planning, the above coordination scheme addresses demand uncertainties and allows for risk sharing (Kanodia 1979 ). We will discuss this aspect of the coordination scheme in the next section. Finally, the processing contract proposed here serves to aggregate information concerning IT costs. It therefore provides an overall evaluation of the IT department's cost effectiveness. This evaluation is convenient to use when other processing options exist, for example, IT outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks 2001) .
Extended Models
In this section, we consider uncertainties associated with demand generation and the acquisition of IT capacity. Insights on how e-retailers need to respond in the presence of such uncertainties are provided.
Demand Uncertainty
We assume that the mean demand generated by advertising,˜ , is random. The random demand˜ has a mean of and a variance equal to 2 . Thus, demand uncertainty increases with the mean demand level. Equation (1) describes the mean demand that can be obtained through advertising spending. The revenue,
is random. The e-retailer decides on the advertising spending A or, equivalently, the mean of mean demand, and the IT capacity to maximize profit. The above optimization problem can be solved by stochastic programming techniques. However, in this study, we are only interested in changes to the optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty. To study this, we take the limit of the revenue when the variance is relatively small compared to the mean; namely, 2 1. Note that the variance itself may not be small. This allows us to calculate the expected revenue (over the random variable˜ ), using a Taylor series expansion and keeping only the leading term in 2 ,
The expected revenue decreases with 2 because S ˜ is a concave in˜ .
We denote the optimal demand, D , IT capacity, D , and reduced session value D that maximize the expected profit in the centralized case.
Proposition 6. With the demand uncertainty,
, where
The mean demand level drops in response to the risk of demand uncertainty. This would normally cause a decrease in capacity. On the other hand, the e-retailer can increase capacity to exploit a possible upswing in demand. Proposition 6 shows that increasing capacity is optimal only when the cost of capacity is small. Figure 6 depicts the region where D > * . In an uncoordinated decentralized setting, the marketing profit is h˜ − A. Marketing decides on the advertising cost A, based on the targeted mean demand, so A is known and has no uncertainty. Therefore, the marketing department is risk neutral, and IT bears the risk associated with the demand uncertainty. From Proposition 6, the reduced session value D is lower in the presence of demand uncertainty. This indicates that for coordination the session value has to be reduced so that the risk associated with the demand uncertainty can be shared.
Nonstationary Demand
The mean demand may not be stationary in a given period. For example, during peak hours the mean traffic could be significantly higher than the daily average. To simplify the analysis, we assume that half of the time the mean demand is − s, whereas in the other half the mean demand is + s (peak hours). Thus, the mean demand during the entire period is still . The revenue function can be modified as 
We denote the optimal (nonstationary) demand, NS , IT capacity, NS , and reduced session value NS , which maximize the expected profit, in the centralized case.
Proposition 7. With nonstationary demand,
The above result is driven by the fact that nonstationary demand behavior causes a higher loss of customers. To counter that, IT needs to increase IT capacity as well as the demand. To induce a higher demand level from marketing, IT signals a higher session value .
Lagged Arrival and Capacity Lead Time
Next we consider the uncertainty that arises from lagged advertising effects (Carpenter et al. 1988 ) and the lead time of capacity acquisition. Figure 7 shows the events on a timeline. At time t = 0, advertising effort starts and results in an increase in demand from initial level i to the targeted level * . The demand increase is not instant, but has a lag of . Anticipating a demand increase, the e-retailer acquires more IT capacity. This capacity is ordered at time t c and takes a random period (lead time) L to arrive. To simplify the analysis without loss of generality, we set i = 0 and i = 0.
Using Figure 7 , we calculate the discounted revenue (with a continuous compounding of rate r)
In the first case, the capacity arrives before the demand and there is a period during which the capacity is wasted. On the other hand, demand is unfulfilled in the second case because capacity arrives later than the demand. If the lead time L is random with a distribution density f L , the expected value of the discounted revenue is given by
where F · is the CDF of lead-time distribution. 
We assume that the advertising effort is continuous, so its discounted cost is r −1 A. The cost of IT capacity includes a one-time fixed cost at time t c and continuous variable (in ) cost starting from t c . Therefore the discounted IT capacity cost is
The discounted profit is
Now, in addition to choosing the demand and the capacity level, the e-retailer must decide on the optimal capacity ordering time, t * c . It is straightforward to show that t * c can be obtained by solving
This indicates that the optimal capacity ordering time is decided by the ratio of the capacity cost to the expected revenue.
To obtain the optimal demand, IT capacity, and capacity-ordering time, we first define r −1 e −r * as the discounted reduced per-session value. We can derive the expressions for IT and M similar to those in Proposition 4, with parameters modified due to lag effects described in the discounted profit L . M takes the same form as in Proposition 4, however, substituting a with ae r .
Proposition 8. If the capacity acquisition lead time L is exponentially distributed with a mean
Proof. It follows Proposition 4 and Equation (10).
To examine the impact of lag effects on the reduced per-session value , we conducted the following numerical experiments based on h = 1, 0 = 1, = 10, a = 1, 0 = 0, 1 = 0 2, = 1, and r = 0 05. Equation (11) gives a fairly accurate estimate of the optimal capacity ordering time t * c . Figures 8 and 9 show that larger values of L 0 and increase uncertainty. This forces IT to lower the session value so that the risk from uncertainty can be reduced.
Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we present a joint marketing-IT model to derive the optimal spending allocation between advertising and IT capacity. In a centralized allocation case, we have shown how IT capacity and the advertising level can be chosen to maximize net revenue. We also find that decentralized marketing and IT departments can achieve coordination by reducing the value of a customer session or by imposing a processing contract on marketing. A general form of the processing contract that achieves coordination is derived. The basic model is extended to address issues of demand uncertainty, and demand/capacity mismatch caused by lagged advertising effects and uncertainties in lead time of IT capacity acquisition. In general, e-retailers should reduce spending on advertising and share demand uncertainty risks between marketing and IT. We discuss three important implications of this study below. With respect to IT capacity planning, this study provides a systematic method for inflating IT capacity to accommodate customer impatience. Although many online firms can be expected to estimate demand and plan IT capacity accordingly, the adjustment for customer impatience can at best be expected to be ad hoc or, worse, altogether ignored.
Another contribution of this study is a simple yet effective way to convey IT cost information to the marketing department using the notion of a reduced session value or a processing contract. Experts in the field often advise IT managers to make sure that the company's marketing executives fully understand IT capabilities and limitations (Ulfelder 2001 ). Both our coordination methods (reduced session value and processing contracts) provide a precise way of doing so. The purpose of the processing contract is twofold: To constrain marketing and avoid overadvertising; and to ensure that IT operates as a profitable profit center. Both coordination methods have the useful property that they can be calculated with only local knowledge of the IT function yet they generate a solution that almost matches the quality of the centralized solution. Both coordination methods are more sensitive to IT parameters, indicating that the IT department may be the natural unit to coordinate the IT-marketing decision problem.
It is interesting to observe that the coordination problem between marketing and IT is aggravated for more efficient advertising techniques (lower values of the parameter a; for example, e-mail and other forms of Internet-based advertising). In the centralized case, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 , more efficient advertising techniques can enable e-retailers to better service customers even if the IT cost is high. On the other hand, in the decentralized, uncoordinated case, the mismatch between IT and marketing is exaggerated with more efficient advertising techniques. Therefore, it can be argued that the need to coordinate IT and marketing is increasing.
Finally, we have considered uncertainties associated with demand generation and capacity acquisition. Here the reduced session value further reduces to coordinate the marketing and IT functions increases so that risks can be shared.
This study has several limitations. The demand for (or the arrival rate to) a website can also be affected by the quality of service (such as delay) that customers experience at the site. Therefore, it would be useful to investigate how such delay impacts the spending allocation between IT and marketing as well as the mechanism to coordinate the two departments. The demand impact of delay at a website has been examined using equilibrium models (Mendelson 1985) as well as multiperiod optimization models (Tan et al. 2005) . When future demand effects are explicitly modeled, the demand in the next period can be considered to be a function of the quality of service in the current period. In considering future demand implications, word of mouth effects, the probability that customers return, as well as other strategic moves by customers, can generate correlated or self-similar demand arrival patterns that violate the assumption of Poisson arrivals. Hence, the underlying performance (i.e., queuing) model would need to be reexamined.
The notion of coordinating IT and marketing can be extended to include other organizational units that affect order fulfillment (e.g., inventory management). Order fulfillment clearly plays a very important role in customer satisfaction and hence possible growth in future demand. Thus, studies that integrate the process of demand generation with the different components of order processing and fulfillment would be useful. Another extension would be to consider the timing of advertising in the model. This may further improve the effectiveness of advertising so that additional resources become available for IT or other areas to increase the quality of service. Finally, the marketing-IT coordination problem could be reexamined in a competitive setting.
An electronic companion to this paper is available on the Management Science website at http:// mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
